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1 Legal normativity is a very controversial subject that has been on the legal-philosophical
agenda for a long time. Like many other crucial debates legal philosophy is concerned
with,  this  one  makes  clear  how  contrasting  philosophical  conceptions  bring  about
divergent interpretations and why it is really difficult to reach an agreement. Precisely
for this reason, although we cannot aspire to reach a standard or a common explanation,
we can and should struggle to gain larger and deeper understanding of  the relevant
premises that give rise to the disagreement. 
2 This paper is a brief and sympathetic comment on some of the ideas that Brian Bix (2018)
advances on this issue. Taking Kelsen’s and Hart’s contributions as a starting point, Bix
tries to set the basis for a renewed analysis and advocates some general conceptual and
substantive  theses  regarding  the  subject.  I  find  his  proposal  particularly  interesting
because he chooses a fruitful  path to address the problem. To be precise,  Bix argues
against two kinds of reductionism. On the one hand, a kind of empirical reductionism
according to which legal normativity is nothing more than a causal contribution to obtain
certain results. On the other hand, a kind of moral reductionism, according to which legal
normativity  is  nothing more  than a  specific  kind or  case  of  moral  normativity.  The
rejection of a sheer factual or moral approach is assumed throughout Bix’s paper, and is
explicitly stated in the following passage (Bix 2018: 36): 
While  many  other  theorists  see  little  alternative  to  equating  legal  claims  with
either moral claims or predictions of official actions, I think the better view is that
either equation is both unnecessary and unjustified.
3 According to this general thesis, legal normativity is not an empirical property. This does
not mean that the law has no empirical features or empirical aims. In a contemporary
cultural context, almost nobody denies that the law – each legal system – is a human
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construction. For this reason, it is possible to give an empirical, causal explanation about
how legal normativity “emerges” or “exists” in our world.  At the same time, nobody
denies that legal norms aim at producing certain empirical results and avoiding others. In
other words, one of its purposes is to have causal relevance in motivating behaviour.
Nevertheless, when we say that the law has a normative claim, or that it is normative, we
are not referring to these empirical features related to its genesis or some of its functions.
We are saying that that the law has an evaluative or justificatory claim as well. One of the
paradigmatic aims of the law is to create duties, prohibitions, and permissions and we
cannot capture,  or at least we cannot exhaust the meaning of,  this normative feature
through any empirical explanation. We can understand the concept of legal normativity
only by appealing to other normative concepts. 
4 The second general idea that seems to be implied in the quoted passage is that legal
normativity is a relatively autonomous concept. Chiefly, legal normativity is not a specific
kind of moral normativity and, a fortiori, it is not synonymous with moral normativity. To
grasp the concept of legal normativity it would be useful to compare it to other related
concepts, for instance, moral normativity. But, if I understand Bix correctly, this exercise
does not imply that we are looking for a unified concept of normativity or a fundamental
kind legal normativity is subordinated to. My comment will focus on this second set of
ideas. On this topic, I think that Bix’s paper must be celebrated for highlighting the non-
reductionist thesis: legal normativity neither means, nor implies, moral normativity. 
5 Nevertheless, I will advance some criticisms of Bix’s presentation. First, it must be said
that there is a tension in Bix’s analysis. Although he explicitly supports a non-moralist
conceptual thesis, he does not seem to assume some of the conceptual commitments that
follow from it. The core of my comment aims to show this tension. Second, Bix does not
clearly  distinguish the conceptual  question regarding what  ‘legal  normativity’  means
from the different  question regarding whether normativity  is,  or  is  not,  a  necessary
feature of the law. This is in itself regrettable. In any case, Bix mainly focuses on the
latter topic and endorses the vision of some authors who support a “new view” in legal
theory. These authors emphasize that legal systems are not necessarily, or not always,
normative. The problem is that they reject that the law is necessarily normative (or that
it  necessarily  aims  at  being  normative)  precisely  because  they  presuppose  that
normativity is a moral property.  That is to say,  they assume the moralist conceptual
thesis  that  (apparently)  Bix is  trying to reject.  Finally,  as  we have seen in the cited
passage, Bix defends a negative thesis regarding what legal normativity is not. Having
admitted that it is neither an empirical nor a moral property, the big question is, what
does legal normativity mean? It would have been interesting to know more about how Bix
understands legal normativity. In this regard, I will submit some brief considerations that
support the non-moralist understanding of legal normativity. Certainly, I do not think
these  considerations  are  decisive.  My  purpose  is  to  stress  that  some positivist  legal
theorists not only offer different explanations of legal normativity (e.g. Kelsen and Hart),
but actually disagree (though not always explicitly) on what ‘legal normativity’ means.
The only way to proceed in this debate is to make explicit the underlying reasons for
these contrasting understandings and the theses each understanding is committed to.
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2 The concept and the explanation of legal normativity
6 To  provide  an  account  of  legal  normativity,  two  important  questions  have  to  be
distinguished: a) What does it mean that law is normative? b) How do legal theorists
(Kelsen, Hart,  or any other) explain the normativity of a legal system? Bix (2018: 40)
seems to see clearly this distinction when he states: 
Stanley Paulson wrote: “Exactly what ‘normative’ comes to in Kelsen’s Pure Theory
of  Law  has  never  been  clear”.  One  might  make  a  similar  claim  about  many
contemporary legal theorists: they purport to “explain legal normativity”, but often
fail to articulate what it means to say that law is normative or in what way that
property requires explanation.
7 The question about the concept of legal normativity and the question about what the
(best) explanation of legal normativity is are different. Bix reminds us of two well-known
positivist  legal  theories  that  offer  two  different  explanations  of  legal  normativity.
According to Bix, Hans Kelsen explains it by appealing to the presupposition of a non-
positive Basic Norm while Herbert Hart explains it on the basis of the adoption of an
internal  point  of  view  regarding  a  basic  customary  rule.  Both  Kelsen’s  and  Hart’s
explanations are sophisticated and we would need to introduce a precise set of concepts
in order to present them properly.  Although I will  raise some doubts regarding Bix’s
reading of Kelsen’s proposal, I will assume that he is right about how Kelsen and Hart
explain legal normativity. 
8 Despite their different explanatory proposals, Kelsen and Hart – along with many other
philosophers – share some basic ideas regarding normativity. A normative content is a
binding content. If a regulative norm exists, a behaviour is no longer optional.1 Using a
language introduced by Herbert  Hart  that  produced a turning point  in  legal  theory,
normativity can be understood in terms of justificatory reasons for action. There are
different kinds of reasons and norms, and the law is one of them. Although Kelsen did not
use this language, he would accept that if something is normative it binds behaviour.2 The
relevant point here is that Kelsen and Hart can coherently assert that normativity is one
of the essential features of every legal system precisely because they clearly distinguish
legal normativity form moral normativity. By asserting that the law is normative, they
are not attributing any moral property to it. Legal normativity does not constitute nor
imply moral normativity. 
9 Given that this basic thesis is generally rejected in contemporary legal philosophy, it is
important  to  stress  that  Kelsen  and  Hart  agree  on  it.  According  to  a  post-Hartian
approach, legal normativity is conceptually linked to morality. Legal requirements are
“fully” normative only to the extent that they provide or trigger moral reasons. This
conceptual move is highly significant. On the one hand, it is connected to what we can
call the “the unity of practical concepts”. On the other hand, it is connected to what
Carlos Nino has called “morality’s imperialism”.3 In brief, according to this post-Hartian
view, morality is no longer seen as just another system of norms parallel to those formed
by  legal,  religious,  or  etiquette  norms.  Instead,  even  it  leads  to  paradoxical  results;
morality  is  conceived  as  the  only  kind  of  genuinely  normative  requirement.  Moral
reasons are defined as those reasons that apply to all of us, and the only ones able to
justify  actions  and  decisions  that  go  beyond  our  self-interests.  Consequentially,  any
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normative or justificatory content, which is not a sheer prudential reason, constitutes (or
implies) a moral reason.
10 Bix correctly expresses this idea when he mentions John Gardner’s analysis of morality.
He  reminds  us  that: “According  to  Gardner,  one  cannot  reasonably  ask whether  one
should follow the dictates of morality. But one can reasonably ask that question of law”
(Bix 2018: 30). In this perspective, whoever asks whether morality constitutes reasons for
action does not well understand what morality means. From Gardner’s point of view, the
law necessarily aims to be normative and if it succeeds, it is morally relevant, i.e. it will
affect what we are morally justified to do. In a nutshell, when we talk of moral and legal
normativity within this approach, we are talking of the same kind of property. We are a)
presupposing a common concept of normativity and b) assuming that normativity is a
moral property. Let me call these two ideas “the moralist conceptual thesis”.4 
11 It is extremely interesting to note that this moralist conceptual thesis is largely accepted
by contemporary positivist theorists. On the one hand, it is accepted by realist or sceptic
positivists. This is why they reject the idea that legal theory has to concentrate its efforts
on analysing legal  normativity.  According to  this  position,  normative  claims are  the
expression of subjective moral preferences. Legal theory has to focus its research on the
objective,  empirical  features  of  the  law,  and  this  enquiry  must  be  done  through  a
scientific methodology. On the other hand, the moralist conceptual thesis is generally
accepted among Anglo-Saxon legal philosophers. Joseph Raz has been highly influential
on this point.  Raz fully embraces the Hartian idea according to which the normative
claims of the law can be fruitfully understood in terms of reasons for action. The law does
not  only  aim  at  creating  prudential  reasons  through  sanctions,  it  also  purports  to
constitute a specific kind of normative reason. Nevertheless, at the same time, Raz deeply
disagrees with Hart about the reasons that every legal system aims at providing. In Raz’s
view, the law necessarily aims at being normative, i.e. aims at creating duties and at being
binding. However, the law is normative (if it really is) in the same sense that morality is
normative. If the law succeeds in creating duties, these are duties in the same sense in
which we have moral  duties.5 Consequently,  the concept  of  law – at  least  one of  its
essential properties – cannot be understood without appealing to morality. There is a
necessary connection between the concept of law and the concept of moral reason. 
12 I think it is important to stress this conceptual disagreement between Kelsen and Hart on
the one hand, and Raz and post-Hartian scholars on the other. Otherwise, we could not
make sense of the Razian proposal according to which, in order to identify legal norms
and duties, a legal theorist needs to assume a detached point of view. Detachment – it is
assumed – is moral detachment.6 However, if the moralist concept of normativity is not
assumed, a positivist legal theorist does not need a morally detached point of view to
identify legal norms. 
13 Bix (2018: 30) correctly asserts that according to Kelsen, accepting or seeing normativity
in our (natural, empirical) world is just the result of a possible reading that some of us
have of certain events: “Other equally competent and intelligent adults can look at the
same world and see nothing normative”. In Bix’s (2018: 30) view: 
This reading of Kelsen and normativity is related to Joseph Raz’s helpful idea of
“detached normative statements”. Raz’s basic idea is that one can speak of what a
normative rule or system requires, without necessarily endorsing or accepting that
rule  or  system. Thus,  someone who is  not  a  vegetarian can say  to  a  vegetarian
friend,  “you  should  not  eat  that  (because  it  has  meat  in  its  ingredients)”  […]
Analogously, the radical lawyer or anarchist scholar can make claims about what
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one  ought  to  do  if  one  accepted  the  legal  system  (viewed  the  actions  of  legal
officials in a normative way), even if that lawyer or scholar saw the actions of legal
officials only in a non-normative way, as mere acts of power.
14 The suggestion that Raz’s proposal regarding a morally detached point of view can be
useful to express Kelsen’s idea of legal normativity is very surprising. It is surprising
because it strongly suggests that we have already assumed that Kelsen’s concept of legal
normativity amounts to, or implies, moral relevance. In other words, we are assuming
that Kelsen and Raz understand normativity in the same way, i.e. as a moral property.
The question is: Is it appropriate to understand that, according to Kelsen, reading the
actions of legal officials “in a normative way” is to ascribe moral relevance to them? Is
this moral reading the only alternative to seeing sheer acts of power? If we accept the
moralist conceptual thesis the answer is: Yes, it is the only alternative. Every normative
or justificatory consideration that is not a prudential reason is a moral reason. 
15 Setting  aside  the  critical  point  regarding  whether  it  is  licit  to  read  Kelsen’s  theory
through Razian eyes, the goal of this first comment is to emphasize that there is a tension
in Bix’s analysis. If I understand him well, the view that Bix is trying to support rejects
the moralist conceptual thesis.  We need not accept that there is only one concept of
normativity  –  a  moral  one.  Although  they  are  closely  related,  we  can  and  should
distinguish moral from legal normativity. Shortly, if we really think that equating legal
claims with moral  claims is  both unnecessary and unjustified,  then we must openly reject
Joseph Raz’s and the post-Hartian understanding of the legal ought and legal normativity.
This is because according to the latter approach, legal normative claims are moral claims.
 
3 Are legal systems normative systems?
16 The  conceptual  question  regarding  what  legal  normativity  means  must  also  be
distinguished  from  the  question  regarding  whether  normativity  is  a  necessary  or  a
contingent property of legal systems. According to Bix (2018: 39):
One might reasonably question whether we (whoever “we” might be in this case) do
in  fact  believe  that  legal  norms  “provide  [us]  with  special  reasons  for  acting”,
separate from the prudential reasons associated with legal sanctions, or the general
moral reasons that some legal norms might sometimes trigger. Additionally, even if
a significant number of  people believe that law qua law gives them reasons for
action,  this  may  be  a  matter  calling  more  for  a  psychological  or  sociological
explanation, rather than a philosophical one.
17 In Bix’s view, legal philosophy should not be especially interested in explaining legal
normativity because it is not a necessary feature of law. In this way, Bix distances himself
from the standard position in current legal theory and sides in favour of a “new view”:
legal systems are not always normative systems.
18 On this basis, Bix disagrees with both Kelsen and Hart. This is because from these authors’
point of view, legal philosophy must explain the normative character of the law precisely
because it is one of its essential features. To be sure, Kelsen and Hart do not endorse the
moralist conceptual thesis. Whoever endorses the separability thesis would contradict
themselves if they accepted that the law is necessarily normative and that normativity is
a moral property.
19 As we have seen, Bix also seems to resist the moralist conceptual thesis, which is largely
shared in current legal theory. Legal normativity does not amount to – nor imply – a
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moral  property.  However,  rejecting  the  moralist  concept  of  normativity  has  a  price,
which Kelsen and Hart clearly accept, but Bix is not willing to pay. By accepting that
something can be normative (i.e. can constitute a justificatory reason) without being a moral
reason or having moral relevance, you have to reject an idea the force of which Bix finds
difficult to resist. This is the idea that reasons are reducible to either prudential or moral
reasons. This is because it implies that in order to have genuine (not sheer prudential)
justificatory power, a reason must be moral. In other words, it implies what Carlos Nino has
called “morality’s imperialism”. 
20 Normative power means justificatory power. When we accept a moralist conception of
normativity, we must accept a moralist conception of justificatory reason as well. The
current  position  in  legal  philosophy is  coherent.  Normativity is  analysed  in  terms  of
justificatory reasons, and both concepts are moral. If the law is normative, it is a kind of
moral reason or it has moral relevance, i.e. it triggers moral reasons. By contrast, Bix’s
position is ambivalent.  As we have seen, according to Bix,  equating legal claims with
moral claims is both unnecessary and unjustified. On this basis, he seems to assume a
non-moralist concept of normativity. That said, this position implies that moral reasons
are not the only kind of normative reasons. To be precise, it implies that along with moral
reasons there can be legal, political, religious, etiquette, or fashion reasons. However, Bix
(2018: 35) refuses this position and asserts:
There is, to be sure, something a little strange about this line of analysis – one can
understand the force of the objection that “legal reasons” should reduce either to
prudential reasons, on one hand, or moral reasons, on the other. 
21 At the end of the day,  law’s normative claims are either prudential  or moral  claims.
Tertium  non  datur.  Legal  reasons  –  that  cannot  be  fully  understood  in  terms  of  the
prudential interest in avoiding sanctions – must be understood as moral reasons. There is
no other possibility.
22 Consequently, having admitted this, Bix subscribes to what he considers a “new view” in
legal theory. According to this view, normativity is not a necessary or conceptual feature
of law. This position is an entirely coherent one. In fact – it should be stressed –, it is the
only coherent position for a positivist legal theorist. When a positivist accepts that the
law's  normativity  is  a  moral  property,  she  is  constrained  to  either  abandon  the
separability thesis or to maintain that the law is not necessarily normative.  In other
words, once a positivist legal theorist rejects the conceptual premises on which classical
positivists  like  Kelsen  and  Hart  have  based  their  theories,  the  “new view”  becomes
obligatory.
23 Unfortunately, Bix does not discuss the two premises the “new view” is based on. That is,
on the one hand, the idea that we do share a unified concept of normativity (a unified
concept of ought and reasons for action), or on the other hand, the idea that this unified
concept is  a moral  one.  In other words,  what I  have called “the moralist  conceptual
thesis”. Bix assumes these theses are sound. In this regard, I must confess a preference for
Bix’s  first  line  of  argumentation,  where  he  asserts  that  the  moral  understanding  of
normativity is neither necessary nor justified. In my view, it is a much more fruitful path
to follow and constitutes a more realist stand. It takes seriously several distinctions we
accept as a matter of fact: First of all, the fact that we admit different kinds of norms and
duties that are not based on a single, fundamental one; Secondly, the fact that in our
current understanding and language, the law is conceived as a normative institution. It is
highly perplexing and misleading to say that legal norms are not normative or that they
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do not necessarily purport to be genuine norms. What does this mean? The only way to
make sense of this distortion is to explain that, against our usual understanding, there is
a strong tendency among moral and legal philosophers according to which only moral
reasons are genuine reasons. So, in order to be normative, the law has to have moral
relevance. It is not only a matter of language and words’ meanings. The point is that, as
Bix initially recognizes, this position does not seem necessary and, above all, it is not
justified. 
24 By abandoning this line of thought, Bix is constrained to disagree with Kelsen and Hart. It
is true that many of these authors’ ideas deserve to be criticized. However, I would not
include among them the idea that legal orders are normative orders, or at least that they
necessarily purport to be normative. To be sure, they are not saying that, for this reason,
legal systems necessarily aim at creating or triggering moral reasons. Actually, it is not
difficult to express these two ideas: a) the law necessarily aims at guiding behaviour and
providing  justificatory  reasons,  but  b)  it  does  not  necessarily  aim  at  having  moral
relevance.  These  are  two different  questions  that  only  the  assumption of  a  moralist
unified concept of justificatory reason and normativity makes us conflate. 
25 By stressing the normativity of law as one of its essential features, Kelsen and Hart made
a relevant point, even if they may have failed to provide an appropriate explanation of it.
However, positivist legal theory has the conceptual instruments to face this issue without
renouncing the thesis that these authors were trying to sustain against those who reduce
the law to a sheer empirical fact: legal orders are normative institutions. Surely, if we say
that the law is a normative phenomenon (non-reducible to empirical facts) and, at the
same time, that it is only contingently connected to morality, we are implying that its
normativity is not a moral property. The challenge for this kind of “normativist” legal
positivism is to give a more precise analysis of what this – non- empirical and non-moral
– property means and how it is explained within a positivist framework. 
 
4 Some concluding remarks
26 In the last part of this commentary, I would like to mention several considerations that
support the same conclusion that Kelsen and Hart were trying to defend: the law is a
normative  phenomenon  and  its  normativity  is  not  necessarily  connected  to  moral
normativity. 
27 In order to support this conclusion, it is important to keep in mind a basic premise. If we
accept  “the  moralist  conceptual  thesis”  we  cannot  go  further.  Assuming  a  moralist
concept of normativity, at the end of the day, all norms and duties will be of the same
kind: moral reasons. In other words, we have to accept the possibility that along with
moral  justificatory reasons,  there exist  aesthetic,  political,  legal  justificatory reasons.
That is, when we refer to legal and moral reasons we are not talking of the same kind of
reasons. Only under this presupposition, will the moral character (or moral relevance) of
legal reasons not be conceptually presupposed.
28 When we have accepted that legal reasons can be authentic reasons, one of the crucial
bases for concluding that legal reasons must be moral reasons collapses,  namely,  the
accepted prudential-moral dichotomy. In effect, a common argument according to which
legal reasons must be moral in nature is the fact that legal norms aim at imposing duties
to third parties and claim the right to grant rights to others. It is largely admitted that
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prudential reasons alone cannot do this work. Therefore, in order to do what they intend
to do, legal norms need to be (or to be based on) moral reasons. However, once one has
already  accepted  the  possibility  that  legal  reasons  are  authentic  reasons  capable  of
justifying the authoritative imposition of duties, one could not invoke the prudential-
moral dichotomy to conclude that legal reasons must be, or must be based on, moral
reasons. We need to say something more about this. 
29 The way to proceed in this discussion is to make explicit what makes a reason a moral or
a legal reason. After that, we will be able to determine whether they share some essential
properties or significantly differ from each other. In this context, it is not possible to
offer the conscientious analysis that this point deserves. Nevertheless, let me recall some
of the well-known necessary features of every moral reason. First, it has been stressed
that  moral  reasons  are  inescapably  binding  on  us.  In  other  words,  it  would  be
conceptually odd to say that something is a moral reason, but is not practically relevant.
If this is a mark of moral reasons, however, then we can be sure that legal and moral
reasons  differ  significantly.  It  is  not  necessary  to  stress  that  legal  reasons  are  not
inescapable.  Even Hobbes came to admit their inapplicability in the extreme cases in
which our  survival  is  at  stake.  Second,  it  is  usually  admitted that  moral  norms and
reasons  are  universally  valid.  They  are  inescapably  binding  on  all of  us.  There  are
disagreements about the universal scope of morality. However, if bindingness on every
human being is an essential trait of morality, it is a feature that morality does not share
with the law. Third, and most importantly, moral norms and reasons are explained as
those  whose  validity  is  independent  from  our  beliefs  and  desires.  It  is  part  of  our
understanding of morality that, in this sense, a moral requirement is ‘objective’. Stated
differently, whether it is true that acting in a certain way is morally justified, it is true
independently of our beliefs or attitudes. In this sense, it should be clear that when we
talk of moral reasons we are talking of “critical morality” and not of “positive morality”.7
30 This latter feature deserves a brief reflection. On this point, we can think that the law is
similar to morality. In a certain sense, legal norms and reasons are objective as well. This
does not mean,  however,  that their existence and content are independent from our
beliefs and desires. On the contrary, it is almost unanimously acknowledged that legal
norms and reasons are a human construction. They are part of a formal, institutional
world.  As  John  Searle  puts  it,  even  though  we  can  have  objective  knowledge  of  it,
institutional reality is ontologically subjective8 – it depends on us. 
31 In any case, many legal norms apply to us independently of our will. In this sense, they
present categorical – not hypothetical – demands. This point invites us to return to Bix’s
interpretation of Kelsen’s Basic Norm. Kelsen explains the normativity of the law through
the presupposition of a hypothetical Basic Norm. We could decide to close our eyes to any
legal normative reality. It is in our hands to read the empirical facts as bringing about
norms:  permissions,  prohibitions,  and duties.  The  relevant  point  in  this  case  is  that
through this presupposition, Kelsen is trying to explain the same thing that Hart is trying
to explain when he says that the simple Austinian scheme of habits and orders is not
enough to give an adequate account of the law. For instance, it is not sufficient to explain
how a new legislator already has the right to legislate even when a habit to obedience
does not yet exist.9 It is also insufficient for the understanding of the notion of obligation
or duty.10 In order to explain these crucial aspects of the law we need the concept of rule.
In other words, the law cannot be explained through a simple scheme of habits, orders,
and threats because it is a normative object. However, the fact that it is so ultimately
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rests on human attitudes. Having said so, both Kelsen and Hart would accept that, as
Leslie  Green  asserts,  “the  law  makes  categorical  demands  upon  citizens”.11 What  is
hypothetical for Kelsen is the Basic Norm, not the positive norms the law consists in.
Once one has presupposed the hypothetical Basic Norm, one sees legal norms and, among
them, categorical and hypothetical demands. In any case, the fact that the law makes
categorical demands upon citizens does not imply that they are moral in nature. As I have
tried to show, categorical legal demands on citizens differ significantly from categorical
moral demands:  a)  they are not inescapable,  b) they are certainly non-universal,  and
above all,  unlike moral demands, c) their existence, validity, and content are entirely
based on our  believes  and attitudes.  In  sum,  like  moral  norms,  legal  norms may be
categorical demands. However, they are explicable and justifiable on entirely different
bases.  As  I  have  said  earlier,  I  am  not  trying  to  suggest  that  these  considerations
constitute an accurate analysis. The only point I would like to suggest is that, if we want
to maintain that  the normativity  of  the law does  not  imply nor  amount  to  a  moral
property, we must reject the post-positivist analysis and make explicit what the relevant
differences between these properties are. In other words, in the current philosophical
context,  a  position like this  has  the burden of  the proof  –  it  must  justify  why legal
normativity is not reducible or subordinated to moral normativity.
32 Bix did not offer an explicit reflection on the concept of moral and legal normativity. The
only thing we know is that, in Bix’s view, legal normativity is neither an empirical nor a
moral  property.  A deeper analysis  would have allowed us to better understand what
justifies his conclusion that normativity is only a contingent, non-essential property of
legal systems. In other words, to understand why he disagrees with Kelsen and Hart. The
suspicion is that Bix’s conclusion is based on the same conceptual presupposition that the
supporters of the “new view” assume. That is to say, the idea that normativity is, or at
least implies, a moral property. This doubt remains. In any case, Bix (2018: 36) clearly sees
the point when he says:
Ultimately, the question is whether it is productive – or, on the contrary, absurd –
to think that reasoning is often confined within a particular domain: that one can
have “legal reasons” that can differ from not only “moral reasons” and “prudential
reasons”, but also “etiquette reasons”, “fashion reasons”, or “chess reasons”.
33 I think it would be wise to openly discuss this deep disagreement between positivist legal
theorists. Apparently, Joseph Raz has only enriched Hart’s conception of law as a set of
norms analysed in terms of reasons for action. However, as a matter of fact,  Raz has
overturned the Hartian conception of the normativity of law. When we accept Razian
ideas about the unified moral concept of ought, we have no alternative to saying that the
law is only sometimes normative. If we take distance for a moment from this statement it
sounds quite shocking. However, while legal positivists do not directly face the already
presupposed “morality’s imperialism”, the only coherent position to adopt is a rejection
of Kelsen’s and Hart’s insights and denial that legal systems are essentially normative
systems. On the contrary, when a legal positivist thinks that normativity is a defining
property of legal systems that should not be reduced to an empirical or a moral property,
by the same token she is committed to rejecting the moralist conceptual thesis and has to
provide an appropriate analysis of what this property precisely means.
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NOTES
1. Cf. Hart 1961: 79-88.
2. Cf. Kelsen 1992 (1934): 42-43.
3. According to the first idea, normative terms like “a right”, “a duty”, “ought” have the same
meaning in legal, moral, and other normative contexts. See Raz 1979: 158–159. According to the
second  idea,  this  unified  meaning  is  a  moral  meaning.  Regarding  the  idea  of  ‘morality’s
imperialism’ see Nino 1994: 82. This proposal implies the necessary justificatory connection between
law and morality. That is to say, the law succeeds in justifying behaviour only if it is based on
moral considerations. See Nino 1989: 30, 114–115. 
4. Apparently,  authors  subscribing  to  this  moralist  conceptual  thesis  regarding  normativity
distinguish  two kinds  of  norms:  legal  and moral.  However,  they  deprive  legal norms of  any
capacity to justify behaviour unless they are either identical to moral norms or based on them. In
this sense, legal norms are conceived of as sheer facts, having no justificatory power unless they
are connected to morality. Cf. Nino 1989: 30 and 115.
5. Hart (1982: 147) has explicitly contested this approach.
6. Cf. Raz 1975: 170–1777. See also, Raz 1980: 234–238.
7. Regarding the distinction between critical and positive morality, see Hart 1963: 20.
8. Cf. Searle 1995: 7–13.
9. Cf. Hart 1961: 50–64.
10. Cf. Hart 1961: 79–84.
11. See Bix 2018: 37.
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ABSTRACTS
This paper comments on Brian Bix’s article “Kelsen, Hart, and Legal Normativity”. It provides
some remarks regarding the concept of normativity and subscribes to the idea that it should not
be reduced to an empirical nor a moral property. The discussion is primarily focused on the
current, post-Hartian thesis that reduces legal normativity to moral normativity. In this regard,
on the one hand, it advances a criticism of Bix’s analysis, which at first glance rejects both forms
of  reductionism  but,  at  the  end  of  the  day  accepts  a  post-Hartian  approach  that  treats
normativity as a moral property. On the other hand, it highlights that this moralist concept of
normativity is primarily based on the assumption that normative terms have a unified meaning
in moral and legal contexts and that, according to that meaning, normativity is a moral property.
The proposal is that within a positivist approach, it is necessary to discuss these assumptions in
order to give an adequate account of legal normativity as an essential property of every legal
system. 
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